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Moods, Voicing, and Anticipation 
Et Forord er Stemningen. At skrive et Forord er ligesom at hvæsse Leen, 
ligesom at stemme Guitaren, ligesom at snake med et Barn, ligesom at 
spytte af Vinduet. (Kierkegaard, SKS 4, 469) 
 
A preface is a mood. Writing a preface is like sharpening a scythe, like 
tuning a guitar, like talking with a child, like spitting out of the window.1 
(Kierkegaard, Prefaces 5) 
 
If it would please you, dear reader, recall the vocabulary of the Kierkegaardian 
preface. Remember its lexicon, its love of secrets and self-effacements. Give 
heed to its masks, its pseudonymous authors who write pamphlets at their 
leisure, its editors who find manuscripts in secret compartments, its thieves in the 
night who copy diaries in anxious haste. Conjure up its sly seductions, its 
misdirections, its Chinese boxes, and its celebration of the chance occurrence. 
Bring to mind the aesthetics of a beginning that is never an origination for it is not 
possible for a thinker such as Kierkegaard to forward first principles or doctrines. 
Kierkegaard seemed to relish the activity of composing introductions so 
much that he once wrote a book consisting of nothing but prefaces, introductions 
introducing nothing at all. He published Forord (Prefaces) in 1844, on the same 
day as Begrebet Angest (The Concept of Anxiety)⎯the first book conveying 
empty promises and the second possibilities without discernable objects. In the 
very first of Forord’s (Prefaces) series of prefatory pieces, Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonym, Nicolaus Notabene explains that his young wife’s jealousy inspired 
the structure of the text. She had objected to him writing a full-fledged book 
because being “an author when one is a married man […] is downright 
unfaithfulness [.]” (Kierkegaard, Prefaces 10). After much fruitless back and forth 
about the issue, Notabene’s wife revealed that her previous objection was but a 
screen; the real reason for her opposition was married to her assessment of his 
literary potential; she said bluntly: “I do not think you are cut out to be an author 
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[.]” (11). The argument continued affectionately and although he failed to see the 
logic of his wife’s protestations, Nicolaus genially proposed that writing a book of 
just prefaces could serve as a compromise: “In this connection I appealed to 
analogies, that husbands, who had promised their wives never to use snuff 
anymore had as recompense obtained permission to have as many snuffboxes 
as they wished” (12). 
If one cannot exercise the vice, one can collect the containers; if one 
cannot use the contents, one has a right to amass the forms. According to this 
line of reasoning, there is a form to faithfulness, but the content cannot be 
determined in advance. Notabene claims that there is a certain fidelity to positing 
without further articulation; Forord conveys the flirtation of language, an invitation 
without an event, a beginning without conclusion, a pregnant pause without 
issue. Perhaps if one considers the aesthetics of Kierkegaard’s indirect 
communication, Forord represents a mís en abyme for his pseudonymous 
authorship, writing as a faithful anticipation of a reader to come, someone who 
will then superimpose her own text as an act of interpretation.  
 Putting the issue of form aside, let us return to the passage that crowns 
this, my own preface, as an epigraph. The word that Todd Nichol translates as 
mood, the Danish stemning, is also the word translated in its verbal form 
(stemme) as tuning, in this case bringing a guitar into proper pitch. This repetition 
in the passage is lost in the English, but is important to note. For a stemning can 
be a mood, an agreement, or a sense of accord. One resides within a mood 
though I would argue that one never inhabits a mood alone, and one tunes a 
guitar to realize its potential as an instrument, to enable it to conform to a musical 
composition, and out of consideration for the ears of the audience; so one tunes 
an instrument for oneself but also for others.2 Interestingly enough, stemme also 
means voice and if one is familiar with the Germanic languages, this word for 
sounding one’s particularity also has a political meaning, a social implication; at 
stemme (at times rendered as afstemme) also means to vote.3 En Stemning, a 
mood, an attunement, a tuning, a voting and a voicing are all particular 
experiences that connect discrete moments and individuals to a temporal 
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fullness, to that which precedes the moment, to others present and those yet to 
come. Kierkegaard’s irony in Forord (Prefaces) resides in denying the reader that 
which follows, and in that manner, his irony serves as an invitation, a preface in 
advance of a meaning deferred. That said, I would also like to note that Stemning 
is the word used to crown a section of Frygt og Bæven (Fear and Trembling), 
which is translated as attunement by Alastair Hannay.4 In addition and as is 
commonly known, Martin Heidegger uses the German cognate Stimmung in 
Being and Time to indicate the mood, intrinsic to an existential ontology. The 
connotations are the same in German as in Danish.  
 However there is more to our epigraph. If Nicolaus Notabene is a proto- 
phenomenologist, one who understands that a mood, en stemming, eine 
stimmung articulates the preconditions, the preface to human comportment, 
perhaps his thoughts about prefaces also anticipate aspects of both 
deconstructive and Lacanian thought. For after he declares that a preface is a 
mood, likens it to tuning a guitar and sharpening a scythe, he compares it to 
talking to a child, and to spitting out the window. We have already touched upon 
how one cannot truly reap a semantic crop without a sharpened scythe, and an 
out of tune guitar plays a sour song; it follows that the preface, the stemning is 
intrinsic to what follows. The second part of the epigraph makes this even more 
interesting, for if one speaks to a child one never knows how it will be received 
(in both a negative or a positive sense—it is communication to a person as well 
as her potential), and spitting out of a window negates any aim or intention, for 
one certainly cannot foresee if one will hit the target. Thus it follows that if a 
preface is an attunement, a situation that precedes the possibility of voicing, no 
one ever knows on whose ears one’s voice will eventually fall.5 A preface is a 
mood, an attunement, anticipating a body that will arrive and inhabit its space. 
So what is the purpose of this ambling preamble, my own sense of an 
introduction?  Friedrich Nietzsche will help me answer the question. In his own 
belated 1886 preface to Die fröhliches Wissenschaft (The Gay Science), he 
writes: “{…} I have asked myself often enough whether, on a grand scale, 
philosophy has been no more than an interpretation of the body and a 
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misunderstanding of the body.” (Nietzsche GS 5)6  I believe that what Nietzsche 
is trying to tell us here is that textualized philosophy is an unconscious memoir, 
but not of the bourgeois variety where the individual is reconstructed through a 
writing process regulated by intention, identification and excavation. Rather, 
philosophy for Nietzsche, and I believe for Kierkegaard as well, is a memoir of a 
stemning, eine Stimmung, in the sense that it is an articulation of a space–the 
segmentation, elaboration, and extension of a location that includes the body, 
and its situatedness as it radiates towards the future and towards future readers, 
bringing forward a history of the attunement that made the writing possible. If one 
continues to extend this interpretation, conveying the metaphor of philosophy as 
memoir further, relating it to Kierkegaard ⎯ it can be claimed that his texts are a 
location where there seems to be nothing personal but where everything that is 
personal is at stake. This seeming contradiction is the meaning of this preface to 
the volume, Kierkegaard and German Thought; the principle behind the essays 
does not reside within a notion of influence or influencing, but in the interaction of 
multiple discourses within a stemning, that which is the condition of possibility for 
an individual voice as it speaks with others, to others, and to texts carrying the 
words of others in citation. 
That stated, if my discussion of Kierkegaard’s Forord suggests that he 
becomes important for Heidegger, deconstruction and Lacanian inflected post-
structural rhetorical analysis, how does Kierkegaard connect to the larger 
pantheon of German thinkers? What is the stemning that this volume will extend? 
What is the attunement from which Kierkegaard’s work emerged, and how have 
his writings contributed to other philosophical environments?  
 
The Volume: Kierkegaard and German Thought  
One does not have to mine assiduously or dig deeply to encounter the rich vein 
of raw material that connects Kierkegaard to German thought. Some of the most 
glistening ore lies close to the surface. For a long time mainstream scholarship 
considered the mother lode to be Kierkegaard’s textual encounters with the 
philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel and his attendance at the aging F.W.J. Schelling’s 
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lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation in Berlin held from the fall of 1841 
through the winter of 1842. These moments are often considered to represent 
the onset of a wider split in the history of European philosophy, giving rise to 
what we now call existentialist philosophy or if you prefer, a movement of thought 
concerned with lived experience.  
    The early and persistent popularity of this position on Kierkegaard’s 
encounter with German thought often hinges upon a contextual analysis, a 
description of a stemning. This intellectual environment was often described by 
emphasizing that the dominant philosophical discourse in Denmark during 
Kierkegaard’s time was a type of Hegelianism refracted through thinkers like J.L. 
Heiberg and H.L. Martensen, and consequently most intellectual historians 
understand that Schelling’s lectures offered an alternative perspective to Hegel. 
As a result, plenty of ink has been spilled describing and defining these 
encounters.  
More than a few gallons have been used analyzing Kierkegaard’s 
relationship to Hegelian thought and through the years two distinct positions have 
emerged; the pioneering work of Niels Thulstrup and a rejoinder to his thesis 
published by Jon Stewart. Thulstrup famously develops a rejectionist position 
where Kierkegaard only plays ironically at being a Hegelian while decisively 
rejecting his thought, and he claims that the two philosophers represent two 
radically different, almost antipodal strains of modern European philosophy. 
Stewart criticizes Thulstrup for not knowing Hegel well enough to understand the 
relationship between the two thinkers. He claims that the relationship is much 
more nuanced and does not hinge on Kierkegaard simply accepting or rejecting 
Hegel’s work in its entirety; rather Stewart argues for a reading that considers a 
more complicated understanding of the relationship between the two thinkers.  
He argues for what he calls a “plurality” of relations.7  
   As mentioned, it is also common knowledge that young Søren was drawn 
to the work of Hegel’s great rival, F.W.J. Schelling, whose Berlin lectures he 
attended in the fall of 1841. Schelling occupied Hegel’s chair in Berlin after the 
latter’s death and offered a different form of idealism for the young Dane to 
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consider. These lectures are remembered (for better or worse) more for a rather 
famous trio in the audience than their content; Kierkegaard, Friedrich Engels and 
Mikhail Bakunin were all in attendance. In any case, it has been argued that 
Schelling’s lectures marked a turning point in 19th century philosophy, not 
because the audience bought his argument, but rather that two strains of thought 
both concerned with “existence” as opposed to idealism emerged. Some 
historians of philosophy trace the origins of existential thought through 
Kierkegaard’s response to his disappointment with Schelling,8 and they also 
understand these lectures to be a seminal moment in the emergence of Hegelian 
Marxist discourse, as Engels felt compelled to defend Hegel against Schelling’s 
critique. Consequently, until fairly recently Kierkegaard’s relationship to modern 
German thought has often moved along the two trajectories tied to a 
classification of Hegel and Schelling’s philosophical heirs; namely Western 
Marxism and existentialism. This has resulted in scholarship that addressed 
traditional modalities of influence; commentators trace the German existential 
tradition through Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Heidegger, with Nietzsche 
occasionally thrown in for good measure. The ties that bind Kierkegaard to the 
Western Marxist tradition has solid grounds also as it was well known that 
Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Georg Lukaçs all were engaged with 
Kierkegaard as young men, and that Adorno famously wrote his dissertation on 
the Danish thinker.9 In other words, until the late 1980s Kierkegaard’s 
relationship to German thought ran along these familiar rails.  
 The rise of deconstruction, post-structuralism, and post-Marxist thought 
shed new light on Kierkegaard’s importance for twentieth-century thinking. These 
movements have inflected the contributors to this volume of Konturen, 
Kierkegaard and German Thought on both the level of subject matter and 
methodology. For while there was a talk on Kierkegaard and Hegel at the 
conference where this volume was conceived, and there are scattered 
references to Schelling in the essays that follow this introduction; the essays in 
this collection represent the variety of discourses coursing through the intellectual 
veins and arteries of Golden Age Denmark while mirroring the multiplicity of 
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concerns we share with that moment. In other words, rather than a reliance on 
singular models of influence and comparison, the editorial principle at work here 
favors a model designed to show the multiplicity of engagements in seemly 
singular discursive environments. This is especially important with regards to the 
textually enthusiast 19th and 20th centuries, and particularly important when 
assessing the polymathic and multi-vocal authorship of Søren Kierkegaard.  
 
Our Contributors: Reading Kierkegaard, Re-Reading Modernity 
In many ways, Kierkegaard’s work speaks to complex collisions within European 
modernity. His engagement with the Greeks, the church fathers, medieval 
mystics, German romanticism, English poets, idealism, and his contemporary 
culture illustrate how modern discourse’s historical consciousness brings 
contradictions into collision. His reception among thinkers seemingly antithetical 
to his sensibilities indicate that European modernity was never completely 
secular, and its conceptions of the ancient, the primitive, and its anticipatory 
temporal structures eventually give birth to many of our contemporary critical 
concerns. The contributors to Kierkegaard and German Thought shed light on 
several of these issues. 
Gantt Gurley’s “The Concept of Byrony” opens our volume. Gurley 
introduces and clarifies the complexity of the Danish Golden Age by challenging 
the idea that Kierkegaard’s main authorial impulses were in response to German 
influence appearing in the form of Danish Hegelianism. He writes: “This essay is 
a counter narrative to Kierkegaard the German philosopher; it is a counter 
narrative to the notion of boundaries of thought. For a moment, let us posit 
Kierkegaard as a Golden Age reader, a reader of the native tongue, a current 
reader and the currently read, in the hopes of illuminating the Byrony of 
Kierkegaard.” For Gurley, Kierkegaard’s impulse to mask comes from his Byrony, 
a poetic relationship intrinsic to his sense of aesthetic masking. Gurley’s essay 
suggests that the aesthetic comportment of an authorship opens up interpretative 
possibilities beyond the surface of its assertions.  
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  M.G. Piety depicts another Kierkegaardian concern that lies outside of a 
rebuttal to German idealism, and while her essay, “The Stillness of History: 
Søren Kierkegaard and German Mysticism,” depicts a connection to this 
movement in an oblique sense, it goes beyond a mere description of an affinity. 
She contextualizes her approach thusly: “The German mystics were particularly 
important for Kierkegaard because of the proximity of Germany to Denmark and 
because of their influence on both German idealism and the Pietist tradition in 
which Kierkegaard was raised.” Piety analyzes the Danish thinker’s theory of 
knowledge in light of the work of Meister Ekhardt and Johannes Tauler, and she 
illustrates how “Kierkegaard’s own religious epistemology […] makes clear that it 
is largely indistinguishable from the epistemology of Ekhardt and Tauler.”  
   David Kangas’ contribution concerns itself with theological matters from 
another perspective. His essay, “Being Human: Kierkegaard’s 1847 Discourses 
on the Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air,” reads Kierkegaard’s 
engagement with The Gospel of Matthew’s dictum “Consider the lilies of the field 
and the birds of the air.” Kangas explicates the passage through a reading of one 
of Kierkegaard’s “two small books on this one passage.” In this manner he 
convincingly illustrates how this particular Kierkegaardian engagement takes on 
the “ gambit of idealist metaphysics,” which justified “self-consciousness as the 
ground of the real.” In his far-reaching analysis, he reveals his own critical 
engagement with German thought in his concluding remarks: “Kierkegaard’s 
discourses must finally be understood in terms of a problematic inaugurated by 
Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart, according to which only that which lives 
“without a why” truly lives. This tradition reemerges with great force, even if in a 
transformed way, in the later thought of Heidegger.” Kangas’ contribution 
illustrates the way that Piety’s fascinating depiction of Kierkegaardian 
engagements with German medieval theological concerns re-emerge as part of 
the philosophical horizon of the late Heidegger. 
 With Michelle Kosch’s “The Ethical Context of Either/Or,” we turn to 
Kierkegaard’s engagement with questions arising out of German Idealism’s own 
multiplicity. In this “sequel to an earlier paper ('Kierkegaard's Ethicist' Archiv 
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2006),” Kosch rigorously takes us through the ethical models and commitments 
available to Kierkegaard in his intellectual environment. She argues that work of 
J.G. Fichte “was the primary historical model for the ethical standpoint described 
in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or II.” Kosch provides us with a closely read analysis of 
both texts and she explains that “[i]t would be too generous to say that Either/Or 
II contains an account of practical reasoning; at best it contains a gesture at such 
an account. Still, some commitments can be drawn fairly straightforwardly from 
the text, and others can be assumed as the only way of accounting for some 
conjunction of textual clues.” 
 Leonardo Lisi also engages with the stemning from which Either/Or 
emerged, providing us with a nuanced and far-reaching reading of the 
pseudonym A’s essay from the first volume, “The Tragic in Ancient Drama 
Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama.” Lisi explains that this essay is 
“possibly among the most frequently discussed and misunderstood” of 
Kierkegaard’s works. He attributes these misunderstandings to “the tendency in 
the scholarly literature to view the text in light of Hegel’s more famous theory of 
tragedy.” In his own essay, “Tragedy, History, and the Form of Philosophy in 
Either/Or,” Lisi shows how previous readings have “obscured the originality of 
Kierkegaard’s contribution, which centers on two basic claims of far-reaching 
consequences for the theory of the genre and for philosophy more generally.”  
 The next two essays take on a comparative analysis of Kierkegaard and 
Friedrich Nietzsche. To our knowledge, Nietzsche most probably never read 
Kierkegaard, and at best read the Danish literary scholar Georg Brandes’ book 
on his fellow countryman. However, there are both dramatic affinities and 
differences in the work of these two philosophers both intensely concerned with 
lived experience. Daniel Conway wrote the first of these essays and provides the 
reader with an analysis that highlights a distinct complementarity that emerges 
when one thinks with these two philosophers together. “The Happiness of ‘Slight 
Superiority’”: Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on Resentment performs a Nietzschean 
vivisection on Johannes de Silentio, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym in Fear and 
Trembling. Conway is chiefly “concerned to juxtapose their complementary 
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investigations into the etiology and operation of resentment, which both thinkers 
identified as exerting a powerfully retardant force within the bourgeois societies 
of late modern European culture.” His analysis avails itself of a reading of the 
ironic distance that Kierkegaard takes from his pseudonym and while Conway’s 
main target is de Silentio, he makes the larger claim that the pseudonyms in 
general often “unwittingly bespeak, or manifest, a structural element of the 
spiritual crisis they seek to document.” 
 The next essay is my own. “Clouds: The Tyranny of Irony over 
Philosophy” argues that there are distinct commonalities in the work of 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, which inform us about their conception of 
epistemological limits and their critique of modernity. One of these shared 
concerns was Socrates: “[…] Socratic irony became interesting for both of these 
thinkers for they understood that the multiplicity of perspectives that emerged 
after his death informs us about the centrality of interpretation in the conception 
of a culture. In other words, the death of Socrates, a primal scene in the history 
of Western thought becomes a moment where perspectives emerge and 
compete for primacy, where the present becomes a moment that contests the 
past, for the sake of posterity…In other words, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
conducted their critique of modernity from the standpoint of modernity, by 
ironically engaging with the ancients, by reanimating the idea of history, 
consequently showing the fair hair of progress to have dark roots.”  
The next two essays speak to traces of Kierkegaard’s work in twentieth 
century German thought, although like the other essays in this volume, it would 
be reductive to depict these contributions as meditations on reception or 
influence. The first of these essays, Jeffrey Librett’s “How to Go Beyond an 
Ontotheology of the Human Subject?: Anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger” 
interrogates Martin Heidegger’s rather ambivalent engagement with 
Kierkegaard’s conception of anxiety as it relates to the temporal dimension of a 
critique of subjectivity. Librett asks “How far does Kierkegaard take us—and in 
what ways does he block us from proceeding—along the road to understanding 
how human beings exist in time, and how time structures human existence?” but 
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his concerns reach further: “This conversation remains of interest because we 
are living in an age—a post-Enlightenment, ambivalently secularized age—in 
which we are still caught between, on the one hand, a subjective truth or a 
subjectivity of truth made possible and necessary by the privatization of faith, i.e. 
by "tolerance," and on the other hand, a public discourse of rationality, scientific 
and/or philosophical, that would replace the objectivity of pre-Enlightenment 
discourses of revelation.”  
Martin Klebes’ contribution, “Mutiny of an Error: Wittgenstein and 
Kierkegaard on Suicide” concludes the volume. Klebes informs us of a delicious 
irony; Wittgenstein admired Kierkegaard’s depths but wondered whether his 
aesthetic strategy of indirect communication could adequately convey existential 
concerns. Klebes writes: “Wittgenstein’s ambiguous attitude towards Kierkegaard 
as a writer, shifting as it does between humbled admiration for the ‘depth’ of the 
Danish philosopher on the one hand, and critical assessment of the very idea of 
such ‘depth’ from the point of view of what we might call the legible surface of 
human behavior on the other.” In this way our volume comes full circle, from 
Gurley’s celebration of the poetic mask to Klebes’ depiction of Wittgenstein’s 
critique of what he understood as the limits of aesthetics.  
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  1	  This text can be found in Søren Kierkegaard. Søren Kierkegaard Gjentagelse, 
Frygt og Bæven, Philosophiske Smuler, Begrebet Angest, Forord, SKS, 4, eds. 
Cappelørn, Garff, Kondrup, and Mortensen. Copenhagen: Gads Forlag 1997. 
469, The English translation is from Søren Kierkegaard, Prefaces, trans. and ed. 
Todd W. Nichol. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997. 5. 
 
2 It is perhaps a point for further investigation that Cordelia, Johannes’ object of 
seduction, compares him to a “matchless instrument” in A’s prefatory remarks to 
The Seducer’s Diary. See Søren Kierkegaard. Either/Or, Vol. 1. Trans. Hong and 
Hong. Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987. 310. 
 
3 I believe that Swedish would be the lone exception here with att rösta meaning 
to vote and röst meaning voice. Agreement however is still expressed as det 
stämmer and stämning still means a mood or an atmosphere in an environment.  
 
4 The Hongs translate this as Exordium in the Princeton edition. See Hannay’s 
Penguin edition for the translation of Stemning as attunement, which I think is 
correct.  
 
5 Voicing amplifies and articulates thought though incompletely; it is a modality of 
a stemning, an inflection or a refraction if you prefer.  
 
6 See Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff. Ed. 
Bernard Williams. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
2001. 5. See also the German, found in Morgenröte, Idyllen aus Messina, Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft, KSA 3. Ed. Colli and Montinari. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988. 
The German reads: “[…] und oft genug habe ich mich gefragt, ob nicht, im 
großen gerechtnet, Philosophie  bisher überhaupt nur eine Auslegung des 
Leibes, und eine Misverständniss des Leibes gewesen ist.” The citation is found 
on 348 in this edition. 
 
7 See Niels Thulstrup’s Kierkegaard’s Relationship to Hegel. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014. This monograph was originally published in 1980. See 
also Jon Stewart’s Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003. There is quite a bit of scholarship on 
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this issue but these two books represent the clearest examples of the rejectionist 
thesis and Stewart’s more nuanced counter argument.  
 
8 Kierkegaard’s great enthusiasm about Schelling diminished with equal intensity 
as the lectures wore on. He remarks about them extensively in his letters. The 
trajectory of his experience can be discerned by regarding just a few excerpts 
from his correspondence. He expresses his initial excitement to P.J. Spang on 
November 18, 1841, writing: “[…]I have put my trust in Schelling…It may well 
blossom [the flowering of science] during the first lectures, and if so one might 
gladly risk one’s life.” By February 6, 1842 this fire had dampened and he had 
begun to concentrate on the writing of Either/Or. However, like most events in 
Kierkegaard’s life there is a tangible divide between his desire to control 
perceptions and his true feelings. Despite this his distaste for Schelling’s lectures 
is clear. A letter to his good friend Emil Boesen, dated on the 6th, discusses his 
reasons for leaving Regine Olsen and his desire not to be perceived as returning 
to Copenhagen because of her. He writes: “Please say that the reason for my 
return is that I am extremely dissatisfied with Schelling, which by the way is only 
too true.” Finally, in a letter to his brother P.C. (Peter Christian) Kierkegaard also 
dated in February of 1842, he begins: “Schelling talks the most insufferable 
nonsense.” Later in the letter he writes: “I am too old to attend lectures, just as 
Schelling is too old to give them. His whole doctrine of potencies betrays the 
highest degree of impotence.” These citations can be found in Kierkegaard: 
Letters and Documents. Trans. Henrik Rosenmeier. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1978. 99, 137 and 141.  
9 See Theodor Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic. Trans. Robert 
Hullet-Kentnor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
